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Using the tick-by-tick yen/dollar exchange rate, this paper examines
exchange rate dynamics for the period of the 1997 Japanese banking cri-
sis. By high-frequency methodology, GARCH estimation and variance-
ratio tests, the existence of a structural break in the foreign exchange
market at the onset of the crisis is detected. We show a reversed pattern
in return volatility after the series of bankruptcies. From the microstruc-
ture analysis, it is found that the change in exchange rate dynamics can
be attributed to a change in strategic foreign exchange trade behavior.
The result provides new insights into the trading activities of market
makers at the onset of bank failures.
JEL classiå cation: C32, F31, G14
Key words: Intraday exchange rate, Banking crisis, GARCH, Variance-
ratio, Microstructure
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many empirical investigations of high-frequency data, especially intraday ex-
change rate data, aim to shed light on market microstructure by focusing on
spot rate revisions around some exogenous event. For example, the intraday
return volatility pattern, such as the time of day eã ect and news impact, are
analyzed in Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996), Peiers (1997) and Evans (2002),
to name a few. Other studies have examined the transmission eã ect of volatil-
ity between markets: for example, Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) and Engle, Ito,
and Lin (1990) examine a spillover eã ect between diã erent market locations.
These studies rely on Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH)-
type estimations and variance-ratio procedures. They unveil several features|
for example, the impact of public announcements (e.g., regular news releases
concerning macroeconomic fundamentals) on the foreign exchange (FX) mar-
ket seems to be limited, while unexpected shocks have a greater and longer
lasting eã ect.
Based on the existence of asymmetry in t h eF Xm a r k e ta tt h eh i g h - f r e q u e n c y
level, this paper further examines the impact of the Japanese banking crisis on
the FX market for the sample period August{December 1997.1 This series of
bankruptcies was unprecedented, despite the fact that massive bad debts have
been plaguing the banking system|Japan had previously experienced almost
no bank failures, at least in recent years.2 The series of bank closures triggered
an acceleration in the speed of depreciation of the yen, which at the time was
1In November 1997, two banks, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (Japan's 10th largest bank)
and Tokuyo City Bank (a regional Japanese bank) went bankrupt|the former on November
17 and the latter on November 26. There were also two failures of Japanese brokerages:
Sanyo Securities (November 3) and Yamaichi Securities (November 24). Yamaichi was one
of Japan's largest brokerages|the so-called Big Four.
2The Japanese å nancial system, including the management of banks, had been implicitly
guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. In the past, as when Yamaichi faced bankruptcy
in the mid-1960s, the government poured public money in to keep it on its feet. As the
crisis became evident in the 1990s, the ministry closed some of the lowest quality institu-
tions and created a bridge bank to receive the remaining assets of failed smaller institutions.
Some banks were encouraged to make large write-oã s, and the government closed nonbank
subsidiaries of å nancial institutions specializing in housings loans, known as \jusen compa-
nies". For an overview of the Japanese å nancial system and the Japanese banking crisis in
the 1990s, see Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997, 2000), Hoshi and Kashyap (2000), Posen
(2000), and Sakakibara (2000).
3already on a downward trend, due to the changes in market participants' be-
havior in the FX market. By analyzing the tick-by-tick Japanese yen (JPY)
to U.S. dollar (USD) exchange rate data, this paper estimates a signiå cant
diã erence in the FX market microstructure after November 1997.
[Figure 1 inserted here]
The evidence of the Japanese banking crisis in November 1997 is, for ex-
ample, investigated from the viewpoint of the Japanese interbank market in
Hayashi (2001), indicating the presence of liquidity eã ects before the Yamaichi
Securities failure. There are however very few analyses of the eã ect of the crisis
on the FX market. At this time, Japanese å nancial institutions were persis-
tently short of dollars, and of short-term funds in particular. The series of
bankruptcies resulted in a dramatic loss of credibility for Japanese institutions
in the eyes of the market, a situation which not only touched oãa depreciation
of the yen, but also sparked an urgent demand for dollars on the part of deal-
ers. The latter was in case of increased diéculty of borrowing in dollars, due
to credit concerns held by the å nancial markets. The exchange rate, beginning
at 115.85 yen against the dollar in August, exhibited continuous decline (de-
preciation of the yen), reaching 130.00 towards the end of the year, and 133.84
in early January 1998.
In testing the signiå c a n c ed i ã e r e n c e so fe x c h a n g er a t ed y n a m i c sa c r o s s
months, we follow Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) and Martens (2000) among
others in estimating a GARCH model and calculating the conditional variance-
ratio. Thus, using the high-frequency methodology over the second half of
1997, we shed light on the impact of the Japanese banking crisis on the FX
market. From the estimation results, it is shown that there exists a structural
break in the foreign exchange market at the onset of the crisis; a reversed
pattern in return volatility after the series of bankruptcies was found. Based
on the assumption that dealers are perceived to be better informed about
future changes in the exchange rate than some other agents, the sources of
the reversed pattern are examined from a microstructure analysis of exchange
rate trade behavior for the second half of 1997. We å nd that the change in
exchange rate dynamics can be attributed to the change in strategic foreign
exchange trade behavior. The result provides new insights into the trading
activities of market makers at the onset of bank failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
overview of the Japanese banking crisis in historical perspective. Section 3 de-
4scribes the data used in this paper and brieç y summarizes the spot FX market
trading structure. Section 4 presents the estimation methodology. Section 5
summarizes the results, and Section 6 examines their implications from the
microstructure point of view. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Overview of the Japanese Banking Crisis
in November 1997
Ever since the so-called \bubble economy" burst in 1990{92, Japan's econ-
omy has remained more or less stagnant. The stock market has been ç at too,
making it diécult for many å nancial institutions to generate proå ts. There
have been persistent fears that Japan's å nancial institutions have so many
bad loans on their books that the whole Japanese å nancial system may col-
lapse. Nationwide, private estimates of bad loans have ranged from around 10
percent to 20 percent of gross domestic product at their peak in 1995.3 The
Japanese government has been struggling, with limited success, to deal with
its å nancial problems.4 The closings of Sanyo securities, Hokkaido Takushoku
Bank, and Yamaichi Securities in November 1997 came as a signal that Japan's
å nancial sector was deeply troubled. Under the weight of `hidden debt,' Ya-
maichi Securities, the fourth largest brokerage in Japan, was allowed to å le for
bankruptcy|a signiå cant departure from the past.
The å rst regional bank failure occurred in 1995 and was followed in 1996
by the oécially assisted restructurings, which organized mergers with other
regional banks after providing capital injections.5
3By 1995, a number of å nancial institutions had been found insolvent. The closure of
the jusen, or housing loan companies, was a change of longstanding government policy|
the traditional \convoy" system. It is argued that the strong reluctance to commit public
funds, despite the shift in government policy, to liquidate insolvent institutions has been a
major obstacle in resolving Japan's bank problems. The use of public monies was brought
up by the government as part of the jusen resolution plan in late 1995. Although this
legislation was eventually passed, it faced strong political opposition despite the fact that
only about $5 billion in public funds were involved. This contrasts with the estimated $145
billion committed by the U.S. government to resolve the savings and loan crisis|a banking
problem smaller in magnitude than that facing Japan.
4See Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997, 2000).
5The banks in question were Hyogo bank, August 1995; Taiheiyo bank, March 1996; and
Hanwa Bank, November 1996.
5Japan's Sanyo Securities Co. å led for court protection with 373.6 billion
yen (USD 3.1 billion) on November 3; a week before, several life insurance
c o m p a n i e st u r n e dd o w nS a n y oS e c u r i t i e s ' request for an extension of its loan
repayments.6
On November 17, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank went bankrupt|the å rst clo-
sure of a large, nationwide commercial bank. Although the announcement
came as a surprise, the å nancial health of the bank had long been suspect. Ear-
lier in the year, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank's inaction vis-a-vis the bankruptcy
of a large construction å rm (Tokai Kogyo Co. Ltd., for which it served as the
main bank) was seen as a sign of less-than-robust health. In September, the
bank announced it would abandon a proposed merger with smaller regional ri-
val Hokkaido Bank Ltd. It was reported that the merger talks had stalled over
Hokkaido Bank's reluctance to take on the 935 billion yen (USD 7.5 billion) of
bad loans Hokkaido Takushoku Bank said it had as of March 1997. Like other
Japanese banks, however, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank was later found to have
a relatively high percentage of its supposed assets that had turned into bad
loans|roughly 1 trillion yen (USD 8.0 billion) worth in its case.
The news that one of Japan's biggest å nancial institutions, Yamaichi Se-
curities, had gone bankrupt owing billions of dollars was oécially announced
early morning November 24.7 It was the third major å nancial company to
fail in the month, following the closures of Sanyo Securities and Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank. Yamaichi Securities had hidden more than 200 billion yen
(USD 1.6 billion) worth of debts, some of which may be from illegal stock
trades. Earlier that year, in August, the eleven top management of the com-
pany had quit for allegedly paying USD 1.4 million to a gangster. The res-
ignations and persistent speculation that Yamaichi was hiding debt pushed
the stocks down more than three fourths. On November 21, Moody's Investor
Service cut its rating of Yamaichi's debt to junk, making it harder and more
expensive for Yamaichi to borrow and thereby roll over its debt.
6According to the news source Bloomberg, the rejection of Sanyo's request was because
the brokerage hadn't submitted a restructuring proposal and hadn't reported that the dead-
line needed to be postponed.
7There was a series of news announcement that Bank of Japan would hold an emergency
meeting on Yamaichi (6:00 (JST)) and that Yamaichi asked the Ministry of Finance to cease
operations (7:39 (JST)). Before the formal closure on November 24, several Japanese media
outlets had reported the conå rmation of Yamaichi Securities' closure on November 23.
63 Data Description and Preliminary Testing
T h ee x c h a n g er a t ed a t au s e df o rt h ea n a l y s i si nt h i sp a p e ri st h et i c k - b y -
tick JPY/USD spot rate for å ve months, from August 1, 1997 to January
8, 1998, obtained from CQG.8 The data set is unique in the sense that it is
micro data|it provides information on trading between FX dealers around
the world. Unlike the stock exchanges and securities markets, the FX market
is virtually continuously active and traded in several diã erent locations on the
globe. That is, the FX market is an electronic market active 24 hours a day
with no particular geographical location; however, it is natural to think of the
trading as proceeding according to time zones.9
Two features of the data used in this paper are particularly noteworthy.
First, it is micro data in that the exchange rates are tick-by-tick. It consists of
the indicative bid- and asked-rates, and thereby provides the microstructure of
the dealing as well as the FX market in depth.10 Second, the analysis covers a
relatively long time span of å ve months, compared with other previous studies
based on micro data sets.11 This span provides a vast number of minute-
by-minute observations on trading activity across a wide variety of market
states, which enables us to investigate thee x c h a n g er a t ed y n a m i c si nh i s t o r i c a l
perspective.
CQG has recorded the value of the spot exchange rate for the Japanese
yen vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar on the tick-by-tick bid and asked quotes. The
database includes the date and time (hour and minute), at Central Standard
Time (CST), the trade session code, and the bid and ask prices. The trade
session code indicates either 0 (Asian trading time, 17:00-24:00), 1 (European
trading time, 00:00-07:00), or 2 (US trading time, 07:00-17:00). The trading
day comprises a full 24 hours from Monday to Friday.12 In the following anal-
8The author thanks Sumisho Capital Management Co. for providing the data.
9Lyons (2001) is a good reference on microstructure of the FX market and dealing system.
10The bid and ask rate (FX quote) are shown on the screens of specialist information
providers, such as Reuters Telerate, and Minex. These quotes represent indicative prices at
which a dealer will be willing to buy (bid) or sell (ask) a particular currency. See Lyons
(2001).
11For example, the work by Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) covers April 9 to June 30,
1989; Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996) examine trade activity over seven hours on June 16,
1993.
12Many previous analyses, such as Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Martens (2001),
exclude data on Saturday and Sunday from their analysis in order to eliminate weekend
7ysis, the date is converted to Japanese Standard Time (JST). The bids and
asks are the dealers' indicative buying and selling prices for the US dollar,
respectively. Since the original data set records every bid- and asked quote, it
includes several \quote revisions"|either the bid or the asked price is succes-
sively quoted. These can be interpreted as the dealer's revision of prices in the
midst of bid/ask oã er for whatever reason. The bids/asks in bold in Table 1,
an extract of the CQG data set, are revised quotes.
[Table 1 inserted here]
Although the CQG data has greater coverage and span, it does not provide
information on the identity of the counterparties involved in each trade for
conå dentiality reasons.13 It also lacks information on the size of each trade,
although this may not represent a signiå cant loss of information on trading
patterns across the market, as seen in Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) and
Evans (2002).
Our analysis below is based on the logarithmic middle price of the exchange
rate, pt,w h i c hi sd e å ned to be the log average of bid- and asked-prices, as in
Goodhart et al. (1993) and Martens (2001). Each of the bid- and asked-rates
used in our analysis is the last arrival for every 10-minute interval. The choice
of price interval varies across authors: Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and
Lee (1993), and Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000), for example, use 5-minute
intervals. Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) averages the last 5 bid rates in an hour;
Martens (2001) uses the last quote of a half-hour interval; Evans (2002) uses
hourly exchange rates. In this paper we follow De Gennaro and Shrieves (1997)
with the 10-minute interval price. The exchange rate return, rt,i sg i v e na s
rt = pt Ä ptÄ1:
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of rt(Ç100) for each month. The
mean of the return is signiå cantly negative in September and October, implying
that the Japanese yen showed a temporary recovery at that time, while the
JPY/USD exchange rate tended to depreciate over the period as a whole.
Although the maximum and minimum values of the return, rt,v a r ya c r o s s
months, the monthly variance of the return does not show signiå cant change.
eã ect. See Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) for details of the weekend deå nition.
13Micro FX data sets such as Reuters, which very many previous studies have relied
on, have limited access in providing information on individual parties participating in the
market, the actual transaction prices, the size of trade, and so on. See Lyons (2001) for
details.
8[Table 2 inserted here]





kurtosis have asymptotic standard normal distributions, where T is the num-
ber of observations. As shown in the table, severe skewness and excess kurtosis
are present in all the residual series. The kurtosis of the return exceeds 3.0;
the return has a fat-tailed distribution. It is also skewed to the left at signif-
icance 1%. Both the skewness and kurtosis are far from normally distributed
for the sample of August, September, October, and December, implying that
the existence of volatility clustering, except in November.
The table also presents the standard Ljung/Box test statistics, LB(12) and
LB(24), for up to 12th- and 24th-order serial correlation, respectively.14 The
null of no serial correlation follows an asymptotically chi-squared distribution
with 12 (24) of degree of freedom as T !1 . The critical value of the chi-
squared distribution (d.f.= 12) at the 1% signiå cance level is 26.2. The high
values of these statistics strongly suggest the presence of serial correlation.
Since the return is at 10 minute intervals, 12 lags and 24 lags correspond to
2 hours and 4 hours respectively. An exogenous shock is found to have a
long-lasting eã ect in the JPY/USD FX market.
4 Analysis Methodology
On the basis of the preliminary data analysis in the preceding section, the vari-
ance of the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH)
model was estimated for each of the 10-minute å rst diã erences of the logarith-
mic exchange rates.
4.1 GARCH model
Following Baillie and Bollerslev (1990), Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990), Good-
hart, Ito, and Payne (1996), Peiers (1997), Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) and
Martens (2001), innovations in the JPY/USD FX market are allowed to in-
ç uence the exchange rate return through the error term. For high-frequency
å nancial data that exhibit ARCH-type dynamics in the residuals, the GARCH
model is commonly applied in estimation.15
14The statistics are heteroskedasticity adjusted. See Dielbold (1988).
15See Bollerslev (1986) and Goodhart and O'Hara (1997) for details of GARCH.
9In the presence of well-known characteristics of high-frequency returns such
as volatility clustering, however, the GARCH estimate is likely to be biased:
GARCH assumes symmetry in volatility. As shown in the preliminary test in
the previous section, the exchange rate used in the analysis has an asymmetry
in its return. In order to obtain the consistent estimate, then, we apply an Ex-
ponential GARCH (EGARCH) model and a Threshold GARCH (TGARCH)
model by controlling the asymmetry in volatility.16 The asymmetry is often
referred to as the leverage eã ect in the context of stock price returns.17
In the context of market eéciency, one explanation of the existence of
volatility clustering is that diã erent investors either observe diã erent news or
interpret the same news diã erently. Even though the market is eécient and
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ef o l l o w sam a r t i n g a l ep rocess, if the information (news) comes
as clustering, this could create as a result a process of price adjustment where
the price bounces forth and back between centers with diã erent information:
the exchange rate follows an ARCH process.
T h ee x c h a n g er a t er e t u r n ,rt, is speciå ed as GARCH(1,1) as follows:
rt = constant + a1rtÄ1 + è t: (1)
The error process, or the innovation, è t,i ss u c ht h a tè t = htzt, ht > 0. Here
fztg is a white-noise process with E(zt)=0a n dV a r ( zt)=1 ,i n d e p e n d e n to f
all è tÄi, i ï 1. The conditional and unconditional means of è t are equal to 0.
As a result, the conditional variance of è t at time t, h2
t, is normally distributed
with zero mean. That is,
è tjIt ò N(0;h
2
t): (2)
The dependent variable in the EGARCH model is the logarithm of volatil-
ity, in order to maintain nonnegativity of volatility. The conditional variance
h2
t in EGARCH speciå cations takes the form
log(h
2
t)=ã 0 + ã 1jè tÄ1=htÄ1j + ã 2log(h
2
tÄ1)+í è tÄ1=htÄ1: (3)
Note that the left hand side of this equation is the log of the conditional
variance. This means that the asymmetric (leverage) eã ect is exponential and
therefore the forecasts of conditional variance are nonnegative.
16See Nelson (1991) for EGARCH and Rabemananjara and Zakoian (1993) for TGARCH.
17The commonly observed fact that a negative return in the previous period has a larger
eã ect on the current stock price than a positive return does is often called the \leverage
eã ect".
10The asymmetric eã ect is described as parameter íin the EGARCH model.
This eã ect implies commonly observed evidence of asymmetry in stock price
behavior; negative surprises (è t < 0) tend to decrease the rate of return rt
and to increase the volatility more than the positive surprises (è t > 0). In the
EGARCH speciå cation íallows this eã ect to be asymmetric. If í=0 ,t h e na
positive surprise has the same eã ect on volatility as a negative surprise of the
same magnitude. If Ä1 <í <0, a positive surprise increases volatility less
than a negative surprise. If í< Ä1, a positive surprise actually reduces volatil-
ity while a negative surprise increases volatility. Therefore, í6= 0 corresponds
to asymmetry in the volatility.
In applying EGARCH estimation to the exchange rate model, the interpre-
tation of írequires caution. In the EGARCH system, a negative shock (è t < 0)
to reduce the \numeric" exchange rate return, rt, is equivalent to appreciation
of the yen vis-a-vis the dollar, while a positive shock (è t > 0) is equivalent to
depreciation of the yen. Therefore, an estimated value í6= 0 is interpreted
as an appreciation shock increasing volatility more than a depreciation shock,
and vice versa.
Similar to the idea behind the EGARCH speciå cation, the TGARCH model
also assumes an asymmetric impact on volatility. The conditional variance in
the TGARCH speciå cation takes the form
h
2
t = å 0 + å 1è
2





where dt =1i fè t < 0, and 0 otherwise.
Asymmetry is captured by parameter çin the TGARCH model. In this
speciå cation, good news (positive surprises, è t > 0) has an impact of å 1 on
volatility while bad news (negative surprises, è t < 0) has impact å 1 + ç .I f
ç= 0, there exists no asymmetric impact between the two. If 0 <ç ,b a dn e w s
has a larger eã ect on volatility than good news does. Again, the interpretation
of çrequires caution. In the TGARCH system, a depreciation shock (è t > 0)
has impact å 1 on volatility, while an appreciation shock (è t < 0) has impact
å 1 + ç .
4.2 Variance Ratio Test
Based on GARCH estimation, we conduct a month-to-month variance-ratio
test. Variance-ratio statistics are routinely employed in empirical work to
11assess the structural change in high-frequency returns over time. In testing
the diã erence of return volatility over a speciå c interval, a test for equality of
variances is conducted. The null hypothesis of no diã erence is stated in terms
of the variance-ratio as
V 1
V 2 =1 ;
where V 1 and V 2 denote the return variance for the two sample groups, respec-
tively. If the returns are i.i.d. normally distributed and the null hypothesis is
valid, the variance-ratio represents a realization of an Fn1;n2-distributed ran-
dom variable, where n1 and n2 are the number of observations. When the
sample size is large enough, the F-distribution is approximately normal. The










2 are the unbiased estimates of variances|in this case the
conditional variances h2
t estimated from EGARCH|while n1 and n2 are the
number of observations. The subscript refers to the sub-sample.
5R e s u l t s
First, the EGARCH and TGARCH estimations are conducted for August 1,
1997{January 8, 1998.18 Based on the monthly estimation results, the exis-
tence of asymmetry in return volatility is examined. Next, the variance-ratio
test is employed to test whether there is a signiå cant diã erence in the behavior
of the exchange rate across months.
[Table 3 inserted here]
The estimates of volatility asymmetry are presented in Table 3. In the ta-
ble, íand çshow the asymmetric impact for EGARCH(1,1) and TGARCH(1,1)
respectively. Estimated íis signiå cantly negative during August{October,
while signiå cantly positive in December, and insigniå cant in November, im-
plying the existence of asymmetry in volatility in August-October, but in-
signiå cant impact in November and December. Estimated çgives the same
18In an earlier version of this paper, four GARCH-type regressions|GARCH(1,1), MA(1)-
GARCH(1,1), EGARCH(1,1) and TGARCH(1,1)|were conducted, the results of which are
not reported here. They can be obtained from the author upon request. All estimations
have consistency in results.
12implication: estimated parameters are signiå cantly positive during August{
October, while signiå cantly negative in November and December. In sum,
return volatility in the JPY/USD FX market shows the usual clustering and
asymmetry before the crisis. However, it behaves \exceptionally" after Novem-
ber 1997. This result can potentially be attributed to change in dealer behav-
ior: in the wake of bank failures, traders became cautious in terms of their
response to news, including issues related to the banking systems.
[Table 4 inserted here]
The month-to-month variance-ratio test results are summarized in Table 4.
The associated F value of the conditional variance ratio for the two sub-samples
is calculated based on the results of EGARCH (1,1) estimations.
The validity of the assumption of constant variance is tested at 0.02 and
0.1 of the F distributed critical values. As the table shows, the null hypoth-
esis of no diã erence between two sub-samples is rejected at the 2% signiå -
cance level for pairs September{October and December{August, and 10% for
pairs December{October and December{November. On the other hand, pairs
November{August, November{September, November{October and August{
September do not show marked diã erence. The large structural breaks in the
high-frequency volatility pattern in FX market occurred in November 1997, in
the wake of the banking crisis.
The GARCH estimation and the variance-ratio results provide strong evi-
dence that the banking crisis did indeed change the behavior of exchange rate
volatility. In contrast to the \normally" observed asymmetric news impact on
high-frequency return for the pre-crisis period, the post-crisis return showed
no time-varying conditional volatility or non-normally distributed residual.
Inferences are that the increasing diéculty in forecasting the exchange rate
prices in the wake of the bank failures led dealers to quote in a wider range of
prices. Also, they were more likely to revise the price of the yen down. These
results support the hypothesis that bankf a i l u r e si nN o v e m b e r1 9 9 7d r a m a t i -
cally changed FX market dealers' behavior.
6 Microstructure of FX market
As shown in the previous section, we å nd a reversed volatility pattern at the
onset of the banking crisis. The change in the exchange rate dynamics was due
to a change in trading patterns following an extreme event: the bankruptcy of
13three major Japanese å nancial institutions within one month.
In this section, we investigate exchange rate trading in detail over the
period|the microstructure of the spot FX market for the period around the
Japanese banking crisis of November 1997. Speciå cally, by examining the trade
activity of exchange rates through frequency of quote revision and width of
price change, we identify a change in FX trade patterns after the crisis. The
r e s u l t sp r o v i d en e wi n s i g h t si n t ot h et r a d i n ga c t i v i t i e so fm a r k e tm a k e r sa tt h e
onset of bank failures.
6.1 Quote Entry
First, we examine the frequency of quote entry. Table 5 gives the average
frequency of quote entry over an interval of 4 hours. The time is expressed in
Japanese Standard Time (JST). The å rstt w oc o l u m n sp r o v i d et h ea v e r a g e d
frequency of both bids and asks for the sample period from August to October
1997; the second two columns provided the frequency from November to De-
cember of the same year. The last two columns provide the frequency sample
average.
[Table 5 inserted here]
On the whole, the diã erence in frequency sample average between bids
and asks is not particularly large at each time interval. The frequency of
quote entry is extremely large, approximately 930 instances, when both the
European and US markets are active, which is 16:00 to 24:00 (JST). Quote
entry decreases a little, but the market is still active and the frequency exceeds
570, between 0:00 and 4:00 (JST). In the period after the US market closes
and before the Tokyo market opens|4:00 to 8:00 (JST)|trading activity is
relatively small and calm.
The frequency of both the bid- and asked-quote entry increased after the
onset of the banking crisis between 20:00 and 8:00 (JST). In particular, the
frequency almost doubled between 4:00 and 8:00 (JST), when the exchange
rate is usually least active (between the New York market closure and Tokyo
market opening). The averaged frequency of bid quotes at this time increased
dramatically, from 122 before the crisis to 204 after the crisis. There was also
a large increase in frequency between 0:00 and 4:00 (JST), the US trading
time, from 461{470 instances to 728{735 instances. On the other hand, the
frequency decreased between 8:00 and 20:00 (JST), which is the Asian trading
14time. For example, the frequency of bid quotes from 12:00 to 16:00 (JST),
when the Tokyo market was at its most active time, decreased from 498 before
the crisis to 412 after the crisis. It is apparent from the table that in the wake
of Japan's banking crisis, FX trading activity became less active during the
Asian trading time, including at Tokyo|one of the three major markets.
6.2 Quote Revision and Price Change
Table 6 shows the hourly average of frequency of quote revision and the asso-
ciated absolute price change. In the table, \positive" price change is quotes
revised on depreciation of the yen, while \negative" change is those on appre-
ciation of the yen. For each time interval, the frequency and the price change
of both bids and asks for the sample period from August to October, from
November to December, and the sample average are shown.
[Table 6 inserted here]
Regarding quote revision, the frequency sample average varies across the
time interval. The bids and asks frequency with either positive or negative
price change ranges from 1.7 to 3.5 between 4:00 and 8:00 (JST): the least
of all time intervals. The frequency of quote revisions increases as the market
moves from Asia to Europe and then to the US. During the Asian trading time,
the frequency centers around 15{16. When the trade shifts to the European
market, the average frequency reaches 18{21 instances for bids and 29{30
instances for asks. This active quote revision remains when the US market
opens. As the European market closes and the US market comes to an end,
the frequency of quote revisions decreases to 12 instances.
Examining the absolute price change of quote revisions, both positive and
negative price changes are concentrated around 0.031 between 0:00 and 3:59;
0.022 between 4:00 and 7:59; 0.04 between 8:00 and 11:59; 0.045 between 12:00
and 15:59; 0.037 between 16:00 and 19:59; and 0.035 between 20:00 and 23:59.
As a whole, the width of price change is larger as the market is more active.
Comparing the price changes before and after the crisis, price width for
both bids and asks changes become larger between 8:00 and 19:59 (JST) after
the crisis. For example, the bid rate width with positive price change before
the crisis was 0.0403, compared to 0.433 after, for the period from 8:00 to
11:59. In particular, from 8:00 to 15:59 when the Tokyo market was the most
active, the price change of bids was wider than that of asks. Between 12:00
15and 15:59, the bid rate width for positive price change widened from 0.0389
to 0.0481, and the bid rate width for negative price change also widened from
00418 to 0.0527. This fact reç ects dealers' urgent demand for dollars with
the series of bankruptcies. The majority of Tokyo market participants are
Japanese å nancial and non-å nancial institutions, which were heavily in need
of US dollars, and therefore likely to raise the buying price of US dollars in
order to procure them.
In contrast, for the time intervals from 20:00 to 3:59 (JST), during opening
of the European and US markets, price change with only ask rate revision
become larger after the crisis. It is also noteworthy that the width of ask
price change is larger than that of bids during this time interval. The ma-
jority of participants at these time intervals are US and European banks and
other institutions, which provide, rather than buy, dollars. Thus, the value
of the dollar rose in response to increased demand from Japanese banks and
institutions.
In sum, the trading patterns, including frequency of quote entry and quote
revisions, show marked changes at the onset of the banking crisis. The fre-
quency of quote entry indicates that the Tokyo market became less active
after the bank failures. Although the frequency of quote revisions remained
relatively stable compared to the pre-crisis period, the width of price change
associated with quote revision widened after its onset. In particular, the bids
price change became larger during Tokyo trading time, whereas the asks price
change became larger during the Europea na n dU Sm a r k e tt r a d i n gt i m e s .T h i s
is consistent with the fact that in the wake of the crisis, Japanese å nancial and
non-å nancial institutions were heavily in need of dollars. The buying price of
dollars therefore soared when Japanese å rms are active in market, while the
selling price of dollars rose when dealers in Europe and the US were active.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we apply GARCH estimation and the variance-ratio test to the
tick-by-tick quoted JPY/USD exchange rate data and reveal several interesting
å ndings. First, there is a structural break in FX market volatility patterns at
the onset of the Japanese banking crisis in November 1997. This appears due
to changes in FX dealers' strategic trading behavior. Speciå cally, our results
shows that the trading patterns, including the frequency of the quote revisions
16and the number of quotes, as well as the price change of revisions, show marked
diã erence before and after the bank failures. In the wake of these unexpected
failures, the diéculty of forecasting the market encouraged dealers to refrain
from frequent quote entry as well as quote revisions. At the same time, dealers
quoted with a wider price width, resulting in rapid increase in the buying price
of dollars while the Tokyo market was open, and similarly for the selling price
while European and US markets were open. These changes in dealing patterns
contributed to the downward trend of the Japanese yen.
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The following is the listing of CQG data reports.
Since the bids and asks are put in at separate times, and there are 
cases where consecutive bid/ask quote are put, the revised quotes
(in Bold) are omitted from the analysis.
date session time price B/A
19970909 2 1028 11895 B
19970909 2 1028 11905 A
19970909 2 1028 11896 B
19970909 2 1028 11904 A
19970909 2 1028 11901 A
19970909 2 1028 11906 A
19970909 2 1028 11899 A
19970909 2 1029 11896 B
19970909 2 1029 11899 A
19970909 2 1029 11883 B
19970909 2 1029 11893 A
19970909 2 1029 11895 B
19970909 2 1029 11896 B
19970909 2 1029 11885 B



















August September October November December
Mean 6.54E-04 -1.40E-04 -1.27E-06 2.13E-03 8.43E-04
(s.e.) 2.62E-05 2.49E-05 2.22E-05 2.55E-05 2.18E-05
Minimum -1.132 -1.640 -0.911 -0.580 -1.283
Maximum 0.500 0.647 0.783 0.418 0.581
Variance 5.98E-03 6.00E-03 5.23E-03 5.22E-03 7.33E-03
Skewness -1.091 * -2.941 * -0.876 * -0.567 * -1.771 *
(s.e.) 4.51E-02 4.39E-02 4.29E-02 4.60E-02 3.91E-02
Kurtosis 19.497 * 68.456 * 24.461 * 6.432 * 26.758 *
(s.e.) 9.01E-02 8.79E-02 8.59E-02 9.21E-02 7.82E-02
LB(12) 27.5 73.7 76.7 42.7 83.5
LB(24) 48.1 90.4 102 71.7 102
nobs 2954 3108 3255 2832 3923


















Estimate of asymmetry in return volatility




theta -5.38E-02 -9.73E-02 -6.75E-02 2.83E-03 5.07E-02
(s.e.) 6.99E-03 7.40E-03 1.04E-02 7.18E-03 7.51E-03
Panel B: TGARCH(1,3)
gamma 0.065 0.175 0.098 -0.012 -0.109





















omparison of conditional variance between sub-periods
The table repots the ratio between the mean of conditional variances estimated for 
wo sub-periods. The null hypothesis of no difference between the two sub-sample is 








  September-August 1.155
  October-August 1.200
  October-September  1.386 *
  November-August 1.117
  November-September 1.290
  November-October 1.074
  December-August 1.391 *
  December-September 1.204
  December-October 1.669 **
  December-November 1.554 **























0:00-3:59 470.26 461.21 728.07 735.83 573.38 571.05
4:00-7:59 121.89 124.11 204.47 205.73 154.92 156.76
8:00-11:59 445.26 453.53 438.69 438.57 442.63 447.54
12:00-15:59 498.04 506.38 412.24 417.18 463.72 470.70
16:00-19:59 937.15 962.33 898.99 912.32 921.89 942.33
20:00-23:59 911.90 908.56 948.63 962.33 926.59 930.07
Table 5
requency of quote entry
bers are hourly average of quot entry for six 4-hour intervals.
The time is Japanese Standard Time (JST).
        August-Octobe
F
The num
r     November-December         Sample Average





















 26Table 6 
Summary of Quote Revisions and associated Absolute Price Change
The numbers are hourly average for each time interval. The time is at
Japanese Standard Time (JST).
   Frequency of revisions  Absolute Price Change
Bid Ask Bid Ask
         0:00-3:59
August-October 
   positive price change 14.0972 11.5556 0.0343 0.0306
    zero price change 1.5833 0.0417 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 11.9028 10.7500 0.0318 0.0286
November-December 
   positive price change 10.9583 13.9583 0.0328 0.0337
    zero price change 1.3125 0.0208 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 10.7708 14.9792 0.0316 0.0344
Sample Average
   positive price change 12.8417 12.5167 0.0337 0.0318
    zero price change 1.4750 0.0333 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 11.4500 12.4417 0.0317 0.0309
         4:00-7:59
August-October 
   positive price change 1.7500 4.0833 0.0225 0.0274
    zero price change 0.8194 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 1.6944 3.4861 0.0199 0.0228
November-December 
   positive price change 1.5833 2.7500 0.0204 0.0260
    zero price change 0.5625 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 1.8125 1.9792 0.0231 0.0233
Sample Average
   positive price change 1.6833 3.5500 0.0216 0.0269
    zero price change 0.7167 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 1.7417 2.8833 0.0212 0.0230
         8:00-11:59
August-October 
   positive price change 15.1111 22.8194 0.0403 0.0362
    zero price change 4.0417 0.0139 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 14.7639 20.8194 0.0400 0.0346
November-December 
   positive price change 12.7708 13.9375 0.0433 0.0394
    zero price change 3.1875 0.0208 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 11.3542 14.2500 0.0448 0.0430
Sample Average
   positive price change 14.1750 19.2667 0.0415 0.0375
    zero price change 3.7000 0.0167 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 13.4000 18.1917 0.0419 0.0380
 
 27Table 6 (cont'd)
Summary of Quote Revisions and associated Absolute Price Change
   Frequency of revisions  Absolute Price Change
Bid Ask Bid Ask
         12:00-15:59
August-October 
   positive price change 13.7917 19.0278 0.0389 0.0403
    zero price change 2.9861 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 12.4444 18.2917 0.0418 0.0399
November-December 
   positive price change 9.1250 12.2708 0.0481 0.0465
    zero price change 2.5833 0.0208 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 9.7083 13.5000 0.0522 0.0497
Sample Average
   positive price change 11.9250 16.3250 0.0426 0.0428
    zero price change 2.8250 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 11.3500 16.3750 0.0460 0.0439
        16:00-19:59
August-October 
   positive price change 22.0694 32.1528 0.0360 0.0383
    zero price change 3.1250 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 18.5139 30.2222 0.0363 0.0367
November-December 
   positive price change 20.3958 26.9375 0.0367 0.0401
    zero price change 2.9375 0.0208 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 18.4583 27.5208 0.0380 0.0414
Sample Average
   positive price change 21.4000 30.0667 0.0363 0.0390
    zero price change 3.0500 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 18.4917 29.1417 0.0370 0.0386
         20:00-23:59
August-October 
   positive price change 31.1944 29.3194 0.0367 0.0357
    zero price change 3.5139 0.0556 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 28.8889 28.4861 0.0362 0.0346
November-December 
   positive price change 21.1042 27.4167 0.0332 0.0374
    zero price change 2.0833 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 19.6875 28.2292 0.0320 0.0360
Sample Average
   positive price change 27.1583 28.5583 0.0353 0.0364
    zero price change 2.9417 0.0333 0.0000 0.0000
   negative price change 25.2083 28.3833 0.0345 0.0352
 28